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	Abstract





Most philosophers acknowledge, and sometimes celebrate, the dialogal nature of philosophy. Indeed one of the ancient and revered paradigms of philosophy in the West, Plato’s extant writings, consists of dialogues. However, too frequently philosophers ignore that true dialogue takes place only insofar as it involves effective communication and that this is not easy to achieve or explain. Do philosophers understand each other when they are engaged in dialogue? Do they communicate effectively? And if they do, on what basis do they? 
	Comparativists should be particularly concerned with these questions because of the emphasis they place on the importance of dialogue among philosophers from different parts of the world.​[2]​ Can a philosopher from the East who works within the Confucian tradition, for example, understand a philosopher from the West who works within an Aristotelian one, and vice versa? What are the difficulties that they encounter and under what conditions may we conclude that indeed they are able to communicate successfully and carry on a dialogue that is mutually useful and enlightening? 
	The obstacles appear daunting, but they are not unique. A look at the challenges posed by ordinary communication and the history of philosophy within the western and eastern philosophical traditions themselves indicate that there are both similarities and differences in the challenges they encounter and those faced in comparative philosophy. It should be helpful, then, to examine these difficulties and their solutions in order to device effective ways to meet the challenge of bridging the philosophical gap between East and West.
	My plan is to begin with ordinary communication and the history of philosophy and apply the lessons that we can learn from them to comparative philosophy. Then I turn to science, because science does not seem to suffer as much from difficulties in communication and we can learn some lessons from it. After presenting a proposal to facilitate comparative work, I close with the consideration of several objections to my proposal.  
 

	II. THE CHALLENGE OF ORDINARY COMMUNICATION

Ordinarily most of us are not aware of the difficulties involved in communication. It seems to us that in fact we do communicate effectively. But as Augustine pointed out long ago, when we raise the question of how this happens, the answer is by no means clear. Let me refer to some common situations that illustrate both the difficulties in communication and also suggest certain factors that lead us to think that we have communicated successfully.   
	Consider, for example, what happens when I order food in a restaurant. The waiter asks me what I would like to order. My answer is that I would like to have the filet mignon. The waiter takes note of it and asks me how I would like it done. I tell him medium rare and then he asks me whether I would like it accompanied by a baked potato or French fries. And so on. The difficulties involved in communicating effectively appear substantial, for the words that the waiter and I use in this exchange are not naturally related to their meanings. Indeed, they could mean something quite different from what the waiter or I mean by them. And if in fact we do not mean the same things by them, communication fails. If by ‘filet mignon’ the waiter means “filet of Haddock,” whereas I mean the usual piece of beef, we would not have communicated. Such misunderstandings would certainly be possible and in fact are common. But assuming that we are in fact using the words in the same senses, are we certain that we are doing so, given that we do not have access to what we are thinking when we use the words, and on what basis can we claim any degree of certainty? 
	It makes sense to think that I know the waiter has understood me because his replies have been expected by me. After receiving my order, the waiter asked me how I liked the steak, not whether I would like to have sugar and cream in it. The latter response would have been proper if I had ordered coffee, not a steak. Likewise, the waiter infers that I have understood him because I told him something he expected, namely, that I wanted the steak cooked medium rare and that I wanted it accompanied by French fries. Of course, even under these conditions, neither the waiter nor I can be completely certain that we have understood each other. Our certainty is only a matter of probability that depends on the length of, and the degree of detail involved in, the exchange. 
	This becomes even more evident when we use the example of communicating in foreign languages. I know no Chinese, but I can assure you that if dinner time comes and I am hungry I will be able to manage to get something to eat, even if I am in Beijing. The smell of cooking food will lead me to the places where food is being prepared, and once there I will point to what looks appetizing to me, perhaps an enticing sausage dripping fat, while at the same time waving some money in my hand. Surely the eager vendor will hand me the sausage and get some of my money. And I will not mind paying more than I should for what I get. At that moment I will grab the food, whatever its costs, even if later I complain and regard myself as a dumb victim exploited by a smart Chinese vendor. 
	Communication appears to work well in practical situations in which instinct serves us right. However, the situation changes drastically if it is not something physical that I am after such as food, but say an action. Take, for example, the very act of pointing that I used to get the sausage I wanted from the vendor. Can that act work effectively to  communicate the way I am thinking? Both Augustine and Quine are known for having questioned it.​[3]​ Suppose Professor Jiyuan Yu wants to know the meaning of the Spanish term conejo that I just used in conversation with him. So he asks: “What do you mean by ‘conejo’?” I get the point that he did not understand the term and I immediately point to some furry animal in a cage. Does Professor Yu understand what I have told him through the act of pointing? Without additional help I doubt it. For what am I pointing to? The little furry animal? The cage? The color of the animal’s fur? Some part of the animal, such as its ears, head, tail, or  eyes? Or am I pointing to a part of the cage, such as the wire, the wood, one corner, or the lock? Indeed, even if it were clear that I am pointing to the animal, am I referring to it as an Aristotelian substance (that which is neither predicable not part of something else) or am I referring to it as a series of states, or as a bundle of properties? Yes, Professor Yu is in trouble since it is not clear that he has any clue as to the meaning of conejo.  
	If we encounter serious difficulties in communicating about concrete physical entities such as food, a rabbit, or a gesture, imagine how much greater the difficulty is when we try to communicate about abstract philosophical concepts and ideas, such as substance, accident, property, relation, category, phenomena, noumena, good, and evil. Of course, all these terms are English, although most of them have roots in other languages, such as Greek or Latin. But suppose that we are not talking about terms in our own languages, say Chinese for Professor Yu and Spanish for me. Suppose that in fact we are in China, and I, a native Spanish speaker, am speaking in English, to an audience composed mostly of non-English speaking Chinese. How can we hope to understand each other at all? Yes, I might be able to get across the fact that I am thirsty – I will fold my right hand into a sort of cup and put it in my mouth while simultaneously I tilt my head to the back to imitate the act of drinking and perhaps make some drinking sounds. Although even this might backfire and someone will bring me a glass of fire water which will make me drunk instead of quenching my thirst, most likely my action will be understood and I will get my water. But consider the difficulty of communicating the meaning of the abstract philosophical terms mentioned earlier. To communicate about them appears to be nothing short of a miracle!
	The situations I have described are intended to dramatize the difficulty in communication in general, even when we use ordinary language both within our own culture and across different cultures and the communication of philosophical concepts and ideas in particular. And yet, as various discussions in philosophical conferences and meetings appear to demonstrate through the questions that are asked and the responses that are given by the participants, we will have communicated, maybe not everything we mean but much of what we mean. So the miracle seems to happen, but how does it happen and how do I know that it has in fact happened? 
	The purpose of the discussion of the challenge posed by ordinary communication in which I have engaged is twofold. First, to show that the challenge posed by the understanding sought in comparative philosophy is not unique, the challenge applies also to ordinary communication. The examples I have presented indicate that the problem of communication is not parochial to the cultural gap that exists between the East and the West. It exists in our ordinary experience within the same culture and extends both to practical situations and more abstract ones. The second purpose is to suggest that the solution to the challenge in the context of ordinary communication helps us also with the solution to the problem as it applies to comparative philosophy.
	I have discussed this solution in some detail elsewhere, but let me here summarize it by noting that the way I believe we usually confirm whether we have understood someone else and the person has understood us involves expectations concerning behavior.​[4]​ I know a Chinese vendor who sells sausages has understood me when I try to buy a sausage because he hands me the sausage to which I point, and he knows I have understood him about the price when I hand him some coins. It is only repetition followed by success and failure that narrows the meaning of signs in the mind of interlocutors. Success and failure are, of course, a result of expectations when we use words. I get to know that the written word ‘water’ means “water” because both my interlocutor and I have certain expectations. I expect him or her to use the word to mean what I mean when I say or write the word. Of course, this method is not apodictic. We do not always tell the truth in conversation, and often we mean something different from what we are understood to mean. But the more behavior satisfies expectations, including linguistic behavior, the more certain we are that we have understood each other. And, in a Popperian twist, failure of behavior to satisfy expectations is an indication of misunderstanding. Now let’s turn to philosophy and its history and consider the obstacles to understanding the philosophical thought of the past and the ways in which we can be sure that we have understood it, so we can use what we learn from it to consider the case of comparative philosophy. I bring up the case of the history of philosophy in particular because it involves understanding through time and this is also involved frequently in comparative philosophy. 


	III. THE CHALLENGE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

We often think of philosophy as either a certain kind of view we have or a certain sort of activity in which we engage. In the first sense, Hume’s philosophy would consist of certain views he held. Of course, not every view Hume held qualifies as philosophy – the fact that he may have believed that a particular person was obnoxious does not qualify as part of Hume’s philosophy – so here we do not need to dwell on that. It is sufficient for us to understand the sense in which philosophy is a view. 
	In the second sense, Hume’s philosophy consists of the activities in which he engaged when we are told he was doing philosophy. And again, not everything Hume did is part of his philosophy in this sense – his drinking a glass of water is not part of his philosophy. Some philosophers have thought of this sense of philosophy as a way of life, and others as a set of rules philosophers adopt and according to which they conduct their business qua philosophers. 
	If we wanted to know about Hume’s philosophy understood in the first sense, then we would have to study the record he, or others, left of those views. These would be texts preferably written in the language in which Hume wrote them. And if we wanted to know what Hume’s philosophy in the second sense was, then we would have to study the record of his actions qua philosopher, whether the records were kept by him or by others. Those records would also be texts, and preferably written in the original language in which Hume and those who observed his actions wrote. So, no matter how we approach the historical task of understanding the philosophy of an author from the past, we must turn to texts. The key to the history of philosophy are the texts we have from that history.
	The problem is that, even when the language in which those texts were written is our own, there is some distance between the language as we use it today and the language as it was used at the time in which the texts were written. Words are living phenomena in a constant process of semantic change. Hume may have used an English word such as ‘sensation’ to express a concept, but what he meant by it may be very different from what we mean by it. So how are we going to access the views or actions of Hume recorded during his lifetime when the meaning of the words has changed? 
	Let me remind you of the problems we had trying to figure out what words mean even when used in the ordinary languages that we use today. Imagine then the added difficulty of trying to figure out what they meant in the past! What assurance can we have that we are understanding those words correctly? Matters get worse when the words that I have in front of me are translations of the original words in a different language from the one I use. 
	When historians are faced with this difficulty, they usually take one of two roads to proceed. In one, they adopt an antiquarian approach.​[5]​ According to those who take it, the task of historians is to immerse themselves in the past, learning everything there is to learn about it, and remaining there. As the famous story by Jorge Luis Borges, entitled “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” suggests, they become so familiar with the way the historical figure thought and wrote that the historian can in fact reproduce the work of the historical figure, not from memory, but as an author would do. Menard is supposed to have rewritten Don Quixote because he was so immersed in Cervantes’s modus operandi that he thought and wrote as Cervantes did. In a sense, he had become Cervantes.
	But to do that, of course, is to fail, argue the critics of this approach, because it does not show that historians have understood past texts; it merely indicates that they have drowned in them to the extent that they repeat them. There has been no bridging of the gap between the past and the present. Historians have merely moved to the world of their source and stayed there. Those who use this approach do not return to tell us a story from the past, although such a return is necessary for a contemporary understanding of the past. Today’s understanding of Hume requires us to continue to be ourselves and not to become Hume. If we become Hume, then we understand Hume as he understood himself, not as we should understand him. To become the object of interpretation is not the same as understanding it. In order to understand such an object, one must remain a subject distinct from that object.​[6]​
	The other alternative is to reject antiquarianism and adopt an approach that has been charged with anachronism by its critics.​[7]​ In this case, historians translate the past into the present – e.g., Hume’s views into contemporary views – thus maintaining the historians’ own subjectivity and the objectivity of the object of interpretation. But in the process historians bring into the interpretive process much that was not part of the past. Hume’s philosophy acquires appendages that are not Humean. And this transplantation to a different time makes interpretations anachronistic. Instead of understanding, the historian’s grasp of the past becomes a misunderstanding.
	Yet the miracle of understanding does seem to happen. But how does it happen? Consider the extraordinary case of the Middle Ages, a period in the history of philosophy that lacked the historical studies and techniques of textual criticism that we enjoy today, and nonetheless philosophers from the period seem to have been able to understand, and understand so well, ancient philosophical texts that they were able to determine the false authorship of works that were being passed as authentic products of certain authors. A case in point is Aquinas’s rejection of the Liber de causis as an authentic work of Aristotle. During Aquinas’s time this work was generally regarded as Aristotelian, but Aquinas concluded that Aristotle could not have authored it simply because the doctrines that it held were not Aristotelian. It was only much later, in the Renaissance, that his judgment was verified when it became clear that the text incorporated materials from Proclus, a Neo-Platonic writer who lived centuries after Aristotle. So how was it that Aquinas was able to reach the right conclusion? 
	Not very differently than the way in which I was able to determine that the Chinese seller of sausages had understood me when I asked him for a sausage. In his case I knew because of his behavior and in the case of Aquinas he knew the Liber de causis was apocryphal because what it said did not match his expectations of what it should say. But of course, one may ask, how did Aquinas develop his expectations? We can understand my expectations and those of the vendor of sausages based on basic human needs and prior ordinary human behavior, but in the case of Aquinas, we may ask, what created the expectations? 
	Two things come to mind. One is a tradition of translations. Greek texts were first translated into various languages (e.g., Syriac, Arabic, and Iberian vernaculars) before being rendered into Latin by scholars who knew these languages. This is how ancient learning was passed all the way forward to thirteenth-century authors. The other is a philosophical tradition of writers who discussed philosophy and imitated ancient models of writing, interpretation, and thinking. This tradition provided a certain continuity that served to connect authors separated by centuries. Aquinas could recognize a work attributed to Aristotle as spurious both because he was familiar with both other works of Aristotle and an Aristotelian philosophical tradition. Hence, he had expectations as to what an Aristotelian work should be like. Now let’s turn to comparative philosophy. 


	IV. THE CHALLENGE OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST

The challenge posed by the task of comparative philosophy has some important similarities with that posed by the history of philosophy, although it may appear even more difficult. After all, if historians are searching for the recovery of a past that is part of their own past, the links that tie them to it can become the basis of a bridge that will allow them to visit the past and return from it. However, comparative philosophy between East and West does not involve the understanding and comparison of philosophical views developed within the same historical traditions and cultures, but to the understanding and comparison of philosophical views that were developed in different traditions and cultures, often at different times than those of the comparativist interpreter. One thing is for western historians of philosophy to try to understand and recover the thought of Aristotle, who is part of the western philosophical canon, and another for them to try to understand and recover the thought of Confucius, who is not part of that canon. 
	Even for western historians there are difficulties concerning the temporal distance between say, contemporary interpreters of Aristotle, but the differences are not so drastic as those comparativists encounter. For the work of Aristotle and other similar philosophers has been the basis of western philosophizing, and his thought has been a source of discussion and commentary throughout the subsequent history of western philosophy. Clearly, there are temporal and cultural gaps between Aristotle and later western philosophers. His words were written in Greek a long time ago, and the customs of ancient Greece were very different from those we have today in the West. So we have difficulties understanding certain concepts and views Aristotle held. His notion of being is frequently the cause of debate and dispute among historians of western philosophy. What exactly did he mean by ousia? Did he mean substance, entity, or existence? But these difficulties pale when compared with those encountered by Chinese philosophers who wish to understand what Aristotle meant by ousia. The fact that Chinese has no counterpart to such a term creates endless headaches for Chinese historians and translators of Aristotle.
	Obviously, there are connections between what Aristotle said and what we, in the West, say today that help our understanding of his views and do not exist with an author such as Confucius. Our language is different from that of Aristotle, but the conceptual categories he and we use are not entirely unrelated. Substance is for us a kind of being. So there are links between what Aristotle said and what we think today, and one reason is that Greek thought has been an integral part of western thought. The writings of Greek philosophers have been read and re-read throughout western history and are part of our college curriculum. Ancient Greek plays are reenacted and Greek art is admired and imitated. In the West, the revival of the classics has been a constant recurrence: in the ninth, tenth, twelfth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth centuries all the way down to our own age. The study and revival of the Greek classics has been a constant feature of western philosophy and so it is easy to understand how we can understand Aristotle, since the understanding of his views has been passed down from generation to generation. Of course there are gaps and difficulties, but those gaps are limited. And of course the language in which he wrote is different from ours, but there have been translations of his work at key junctures of western history that have maintained bridges between Aristotle and the various periods of western philosophy. Also, although the culture of which he was a part was different from ours, we are inheritors of that culture and we have studied and revered it throughout our history. 
	The situation with eastern philosophy is often quite different, however. Not only is the language and culture of Confucius, say, different from ours, but it is foreign to the West. And the links between our societies and his society have been sporadic and tenuous at best. There have been entire periods of the history of the East and the West in which there has been no communication to speak of between the two worlds. The books and writings of Chinese philosophers have been largely absent from western philosophical canons and the philosophy curriculum. How many philosophers in the West know anything significant about Confucius’s thought? Think of Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Hume. And the likes of Leibniz and Heidegger, who have considered eastern thought, have often ended up with controversial or mistaken interpretations. 
	Yes, there have been some attempts in the West at communicating and learning about the East. The Analects of Confucius have been translated into European languages, but the first translation into English was done only in the seventeenth century. And even after that, the interest in his work by western philosophers has been sporadic at best. To this day, eastern philosophy is not part of the standard college curriculum, is not frequently taught, and only few students interested in philosophy take it. Very few philosophers in the United States teach courses in this area and fewer still consider it to be their area of specialty. The result is that the discussion of eastern philosophy is a rarity in western philosophical circles, and it is difficult to find any mainstream western philosopher who ever mentions or cites an eastern philosopher. The gap that separates the East and the West is enormous, and the effort to bridge it appears doomed to fail from the start.
	One feature of eastern philosophy that separates it from western philosophy and makes it difficult for western philosophers to engage it is the way in which eastern philosophers practice their craft and the mode in which they express themselves. Eastern classic philosophers frequently speak in aphorisms, short sayings that are pregnant with meaning but are frequently anecdotal and highly symbolic. Metaphor is frequent and analogies abound. One way to put this is to say that eastern philosophy tends to be literary in exposition. Philosophers express themselves in poetic terms that suggest rather than say. Also they often philosophize by commenting on their philosophical classics, whereas in the West, although the historical approach of commentary is well established, there is a tradition of doing philosophy unhistorically. One might say that the model for philosophical expression and philosophical procedure in the East is literature and history. 
	In the West, however, from as early as the Greek period, the predominant model for philosophy has been science, not literature or history. Yes, some philosophers have written in literary and historical terms, but a great number of them have considered themselves scientists of sorts, and have modeled their procedures after such sciences as geometry (e.g., Spinoza), mathematics (e.g., Descartes), and biology (e.g., Aristotle). Even those interested in literature and history, do not consider the opinions of other philosophers as authoritative as they are considered in the East, but as views that need to be subjected to criticism. Of course, exceptions exist. One need only recall the importance of authority and commentary in philosophy in the Middle Ages. But even then, authorities tended to carry less weight than argument, except in theology, as Aquinas points out.​[8]​ Western philosophers at the time considered themselves scientists, rather than literary writers or historians, although their view of science was modeled after Aristotle’s as presented in the Posterior Analytics. 
	In short, what seems to work for ordinary communication and the history of philosophy does not seem to be enough for comparative philosophy. The expectations that validate ordinary communication and knowledge of the history of philosophy do not appear sufficient in the case of comparative philosophy, because it is not clear that we have any expectations concerning the terms used in comparative philosophy. Clearly, the gap between East and West looms large. Are we at a loss then? Is there any lead to a solution?


	V. THE MODEL OF SCIENCE

The reference to a scientific conception of philosophy in the West brings me to the fact that science does not seem to face the challenges posed by comparative philosophy. I do not see that Chinese scientists have any difficulty in understanding what western scientists claim about this or that scientific discovery, nor do I know of any difficulties of western scientists understanding discoveries in any field made by Chinese scientists. Figuring out some of the reasons for it may help us to choose a method that facilitates comparative philosophy. Our questions then are: What is the difference between comparative philosophy and science? Why is it that there does not seem to be any serious gap between Chinese science and American science, for example, whereas there seems to be one between eastern and western philosophy? 
	A western cynic might simply say that it is because the Chinese have just copied what westerners do, so that their science is western science. But this is too simplistic – never mind about being insulting –  because even if it were true, the fact still remains that the Chinese had to learn western science effectively. The question remains, then, why is this possible, whereas it does not seem to be the case of philosophy? 
	The answer to this question would be easier if in fact we could claim that science is all of a kind, having the same method, assumptions, and goals. But this is not true. There is no such a thing as “science”; there are only sciences. Neither is there one scientific method, scientific language, or even scientific goal. Just open books of physics, psychology, sociology, and medicine and you will find widely different claims as to methodology and goals. Each science seems to have developed specific ways of proceeding and goals that have been established and become accepted. The goals of some sciences are purely theoretical – the understanding of how things work – but in other sciences, the goals seem to be practical – the effective treatment and prevention of decease. So, given that there is not one scientific method or goal, is there something that separates sciences from philosophy that makes sciences translatable and understandable across cultures and times and makes philosophy face greater difficulties in being translated and understandable across cultures and times? 
	Here are four differences that appear to be significant and whose awareness may help to develop a solution that meets the challenges posed by comparative philosophy. First, religion and philosophy have had a close relationship at certain times and in certain cultures. In the West in particular, religious topics were the center of philosophical speculation during the Middle Ages. The question of God’s existence, the relation between faith and reason, and issues related to human conduct were central to the philosophy of this period. Indeed, even topics such as universals and individuation were discussed to a great extent because they had religious implications. Philosophy was subordinated to theology, which was considered to be the queen of the sciences. Moreover, religious authority trumped scientific theories, and philosophical discourse included hallmarks of religious discourse, such as symbolism and an emphasis on transcendence.
	The case with sciences has been quite different, however. From the very beginning an attempt was made in the West to separate scientific knowledge and inquiry from religion and faith. Going back to the Greeks, religious authority was given a minimal, if any, role to play in scientific inquiry. The mode of knowing characterized by faith was rejected in science even by believers such as Aquinas. Symbolism was purged from scientific discourse and reason trumped faith. 
	Second, most philosophy is written in ordinary language because it is often intended for everyone and as such cannot presuppose information that is not expressible in it. Of course, some philosophy is highly technical, but this is usually consigned to such branches of the discipline as logic and the philosophy of science. Indeed, an entire school of philosophy that flourished in the twentieth century advocated the use of ordinary language and held that philosophical problems are usually the result of linguistic confusions and need to be dissolved rather than solved through the use of linguistic analysis. But the sciences generally use a stipulated technical vocabulary so as to maintain the discourse at a level of precision and unambiguity that is quite foreign to most  ordinary language.
	Third, philosophers have tried to develop methodological principles to use in the discipline from the very beginning. We need only point to Aristotle’s early attempts in this direction in the Organon. But the majority of philosophers share a general reliance on broad logical principles that apply to effective reasoning. This contrasts with the specialized methodologies of particular sciences. As pointed out above, each science has a particular and specialized methodology that distinguishes it and is evident in the way it establishes its conclusions. By contrast, philosophy is not so narrowly specialized in methodology. Philosophers are content with using effective ways of demonstrating conclusions based on universally valid logical principles. Mostly philosophy is not interested in the particular, although some philosophers favor the particular and an intuitive and personal way of establishing conclusions. 	Finally, many philosophers think of philosophy as a discipline that solves problems; they consider themselves to be problem solvers, but many others do not. For many philosophy is a way of personal expression, or a discipline that seeks to understand the past and themselves. They question whether there are in fact philosophical problems and, even if there are, whether they are solvable.
	Sciences on the contrary are all about solving problems, whether this means finding a cure for cancer, determining what caused the Maya to abandon their cities, measuring the depth of the ocean, mapping the human genome, establishing the composition of atoms, determining whether the sun rotates around the earth or vive versa, and so on. Sciences have evolved as ways to solve the problems, both practical and theoretical, that humans encounter. 
	These four characteristics of sciences that distinguish them from philosophy explain why sciences travel well across cultures and times. Sciences ignore religion, use technical and stipulated vocabulary, employ highly specialized methods, and are intended to solve problems that are universal in the sense that they apply in similar circumstances. Philosophy is often mixed with religion, uses ordinary language, does not have a specialized method, and sometimes is not intended to solve problems. This makes philosophy more prone to be influenced by particular circumstances that make it difficult to apply its conclusions across times and cultures. So the challenge for comparativists is to find a way of doing philosophy that emulates the transtemporal and transcultural success of sciences without abandoning what is essential to it.
	We could do this by making philosophy emulate the sciences closely, so that it becomes one more science. But that would turn philosophy into something that it has not been. Still, I believe that if we look at some of the characteristics of sciences that make them successful, philosophy can adopt or emulate them in ways that help philosophy without transforming it into something that it is not. This is what I have called elsewhere the Framework Approach. I originally proposed it to deal with the understanding and recovery of the history of philosophy, but I think its use can be effectively extended to cover comparative philosophy as well precisely because the history of philosophy often entails transtemporal and transcultural understandings, which are the conditions that challenge comparative philosophy.	


	VI. THE FRAMEWORK APPROACH

First, the Framework Approach keeps what we learned was effective in ordinary communication and the history of philosophy. Ordinary communication is based on a process of trial and error based on expectations which are in turn based on common and basic human needs. The history of philosophy also involves expectations, but these go beyond those involved in ordinary communication, extending to traditions based on widely used translations and ways of thinking philosophically. Second, the Framework Approach incorporates some of the features of the  sciences. Sciences keep a distance from religion, have developed precise stipulative terminologies, employ specialized methods that they make explicit, and adopt a problems approach.
	The Framework Approach does not imitate the methods of sciences insofar as there is no single method used by all sciences. The time in which philosophers thought that they could reproduce “the method of science” in philosophy, as the members of the Vienna Circle believed they could do, is past, at least for the moment. But philosophy can profit from considering some aspects of scientific methodologies that are frequently absent in philosophy and can help us communicate. Let me mention three that I believe to be particularly important: the formulation of a problem, the development of an appropriate conceptual framework to address the problem, and the use of technical stipulative terminology as needed.
	If a main aim of philosophy is taken to be, like that of the sciences, the solution to problems, it is essential for philosophers who wish to communicate to make sure that they identify the problems about which they wish to communicate. This must begin with an attempt at formulating them clearly and setting out the possible solutions that appear viable. Philosophers who wish to communicate with their contemporaries, to recover what the history of philosophy has contributed that is pertinent, or to understand what philosophers from other cultures have had to say about these problems, must obviously begin by getting clear on what they themselves understand about the problems. This entails clear formulations followed by lists of possible alternative answers and, quite as important, some of the fundamental arguments that have been used to accept or reject these answers. Without this, comparativists would be lost. Only if they have these sign posts clear can they proceed to talk to someone else about them and ask questions that can lead to effective communication with other philosophers whether from the present, the past, or other cultures.
	The formulation of the problems is not enough, however, insofar as the interlocutors in the comparativist dialogue themselves might not have proper formulations of problems, or the texts that need to be understood might be incomplete or vague. This is why considering possible solutions helps to the extent that they indicate the thinking that stands or stood behind the texts. Even more important is the possible solutions offered, for they would indicate and narrow down the frameworks of the problems and help determine whether the historical or cultural sources are talking about the same things that interpreters are.
	This assumes that comparativists know the languages of the texts they interpret and compare. This is similar to the issue raised above concerning ordinary language. And how do we do that? How do we communicate in ordinary language, whether in our own or a foreign language, and know when our interpretation of our source has effectively taken place? The answer is that we do it through our ability accurately to predict responses. To make sure that I understand what you say to me, I would have to have expectations as to what you mean, so that these expectations can be judged to be fulfilled or defeated. If the first, then I have some evidence that I am understanding you, and if they are defeated, then it is likely that I misunderstood you. This applies also to texts from the history of philosophy as well as philosophical texts from other cultures. This procedure allows philosophers to conjecture ways that should be expected of the source, which when found to occur would confirm that the interpreter is on the right track, and if missing suggest a possible misinterpretation. 
	Let me add that it goes without saying that, as Prof. Ivanhoe points out, historians and comparativists, if their work is to be taken as accurately reflecting the integrity of the meaning of interpretanda, require intense and thorough historical, linguistic, and cultural knowledge.​[9]​ Otherwise, there is no hope of getting at the true meaning of an interpretandum. A failure in this area can only result in the best of cases in clever philosophical analyses that do not reflect, and often misinterpret, historical or cultural sources. But they also require what the Framework Approach provides.


	VII. OBJECTIONS TO THE FRAMEWORK APPROACH

Although in my view the Framework Approach is a good tool to make some headway toward a solution of the challenges posed by comparative philosophy, it is not an apodictic method by any means. Indeed, it is no panacea. It is meant to help in a process that is never quite finished, not because the views the interpreters are trying to gage are necessarily unstable, but because the views of interpreters, their language, and their presuppositions are. Yet, although the use of these controls are not as clear cut and strict as they are in some sciences, they can nonetheless go a long way toward the solution to the challenges mentioned and the achievement of the ultimate end of transtemporal and transcultural understanding. But let me voice and respond to three objections that may be raised against the Framework Approach: one, it results in anachronism when used in the history of philosophy; two, it is culture centric and therefore unable to bridge the gap it is intended to bridge when it is used in comparative philosophy; and three, it wrongly makes of philosophy a kind of science.
	The first criticism is that the formulation of a problem and the development of a conceptual framework necessarily end up in anachronistic history of philosophy. The reason is that this approach does not allow the historical past to speak to us itself, to reveal itself to us in its own terms, but rather imposes the parameters of a contemporary framework on its understanding when such parameters may not have been operative in it. What we get by using the Framework Approach, according to this objection, is not the past as it was, but the past as translated into contemporary terms and fitted into a contemporary conceptual grid, a Procrustean bed that cuts out whatever does not fit in it. The past that we understand, then, may never have existed, being rather the creation of an interpreter.
	The answer to this objection is, first, that the aim of the Framework Approach is not to impose the interpreter’s conceptual framework on the past. The aim is to have in hand a comparative tool that is clear and well formulated and can serve us to see what is similar and different between what  present-day interpreters think and what philosophers from the past thought. The understanding of the philosophical past is always comparative, and so we need to begin by establishing the terms of comparison. Appropriately, this should begin with our own views, for the term of comparison that we know best is the one that belongs to us. If we are not clear about the problem we are concerned with, the conceptual framework we use, or the possible solutions to the problem, then it is unlikely that we will reach a successful outcome. We cannot understand others if we do not understand ourselves. And in philosophy the first step toward understanding ourselves is to get clear on what we think. 
	Indeed, second, a fundamental function of the conceptual framework of the Framework Approach is to prevent us from unwittingly reading into the interpretandum our own presuppositions and biases. Transtemporal and transcultural understanding requires bringing into the open the presuppositions and biases of those engaged in it, making them explicit. One of the greatest stumbling blocks to understanding others – in our time, in the past, or from other cultures – is the set of hidden assumptions and biases that muddle communication and mislead interlocutors. Making these explicit can guard us against these obstacles. Formulating a problem and making explicit the conceptual framework in which it is presented by the historian or comparativist is like saying in a conversation: “This is what I bring with me to this conversation; this is what I think.” This is a first step to be followed by the inquiry into how similar or different it is from the meaning of the interpretandum, that is, the points of view of others.
	Third, the formulation of the problem and the conceptual framework used in the Framework Approach are supposed to be flexible and avoid oversimplification. This means that when we get involved in dialogue with others, be they philosophers from the past or present, whether from our culture or not, we should be able to modify the formulation and conceptual framework as we go along. The expectations we have based on what we think and the principles we follow create checks that will tell us whether we are on the right track or have lost our way. This procedure is a means of verification and falsification, not different from what happens when we order food from a vendor in a country where we do not know the language. Expectations will determine whether we have communicated effectively with the vendor. 
	 The second criticism is similar to the previous one except that, instead of charging the method with anachronism, it charges it with producing culture-centric results. When I formulate a philosophical problem and develop a conceptual framework around it, I do it as a western man, with all the cultural biases that it implies. The result, then, would not be the philosophy I am trying to understand, say eastern philosophy, but western philosophy in a superficial eastern garb. 
	The answer given to the first objection works here as well. The function of the Framework Approach is not to be imposed on those the interpreter is trying to understand, but to serve as a basis for verification and falsification that can lead to modifications and eventually understanding where we are conceptually and where our interpretandum or interlocutor is. Here I should mention that I am taking for granted that we are communicating with humans and human sources, and insofar as this is true, we share some basic traits. Anyone who has owned cats knows that they share much, although they also have differences. It would be absurd, as some hold, that humans do not share common traits. Our genetic make up is extraordinarily similar, and this similarity expresses itself in a variety of behaviors and conceptual traits. It should not be surprising then that many of the philosophical questions and solutions to them that we develop are similar, regardless of time and place. And here we must remember science. No one doubts that scientists from China and from the United States are dealing with the same problems when they try to find the causes of global warming, for example. And the same should apply in philosophy.  
	The third criticism is that the Framework Approach would make philosophy a kind of science and this is not what philosophy has been, is, or should be. Indeed, it is true that, although some philosophers have thought of philosophy as a science, many have not. They have thought of it as a way of life, or as the expression of the individual self – think of some Greeks and the Romantics in western philosophy and many eastern philosophers of note. According to them, philosophy is not always, or even mostly, concerned with the solution to problems, and least of all conceptual problems. The philosophy that concentrates on problems, so the objection goes, is just one kind of philosophy popular in the West, but certainly not in the East. 	
	One answer to this objection is that the use of a Framework Approach may seem like the scientific method to some, but in fact this inference is far from being accurate for several reasons. First, because not all sciences are of the same sort and the methods used in them vary widely, as mentioned before. However, it is true that all sciences are concerned with solving problems. And the Framework Approach assumes that philosophy is like science in this very restricted sense, although some philosophers disagree with this statement. I have no objection to calling them philosophers or saying that what they do is philosophy. But my argument here is not meant for them, but for philosophers who think of their discipline as involving problem solving. I will let others deal with philosophy understood differently. However, I do believe that eastern philosophers are for the most part concerned with solving problems. Are not Eastern philosophers concerned with the nature of the good life, the proper and just organization of society, and the harmony and balance between yin and yang, for example? This means that what I have said applies well to those eastern philosophers, and if it does, then we have made some advance concerning East-West transtemporal and transcultural communication. 
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